A Critical Analysis of Psychological warfare inside an Armed Conflict

Author: Asad Aman

ABSTRACT

This paper delves into the ambiguous boundaries of psychological warfare in armed conflict, and through the legal opinion of experts, navigates the tension between strategic validity and psychological manipulation. Though regarded as non-violent measure by International forum, its shifting practices from traditional propaganda to AI driven disinformation, obscure its legal and moral standing. The given analysis, dependent upon the circumstances, probes whether such tactics align with the framework of International Humanitarian Law or quietly erode its principle protections.

“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

Sun Tzu (500–350 B.C.E.)

“Machines don’t fight wars. Terrain doesn’t fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the mind of humans. That’s where the battles are won”.

Col. John R. Boyd (1927–1997) The means of warfare refer to the weapons used or being used during an armed conflict, whereas the methods pertain to the tactics or strategies employed during the conflict. The distinction between means and methods of warfare was highlighted in Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, where the court concluded that the methods of warfare are regulated by International Humanitarian Law(IHL), which includes principles such as proportionality, distinction, military necessity, and the protection of civilian objects. However, the right to choose these means and methods is not unlimited. For example, poison is an inherently unlawful weapon (means), but a method that abusively targets the civilian population is prohibited in every instance. In this case, it is not the means that are unlawful, but the method itself. The phrase “In war, truth is the first casualty” is often used to describe the deceptive nature of psychological warfare. Psychological warfare, frequently referred as “Psyops” or “Psywar” encompasses the means and technology to transmit, store and elaborate information as well as the material concepts based on information as knowledge and belief. It tends to target someone’s or a general population’s basic understanding of any entity whether natural or legal. Although considered as a non-violent measure, it still can breach IHL provisions if misused. Psychological warfare algorithm directs legal experts such as Michael Bothe, to conclude that it does not qualify as an attack, However it is still considered a military tactic (whether psychological warfare qualifies to be called as military operation or not, is still debated upon) used to demoralize the enemy or to shape the enemy’s image in the eyes of the public. Additionally, within broader context it has been considered as propaganda or political warfare. Though, in the legal lens of experts, the propaganda warfare or even disinformation to provoke the local population to oust the government is seen as unproblematic. However, that leniency in the usage of psychological warfare does come with sets of limits imposed by International Humanitarian Law. These limitations include; prohibition of promotion of IHL violations, prohibition of perfidy and limits imposed on ruses of war, prohibition of threats of violence against civilian population , and prohibition on exposing inhumane or degraded treatment concerning public intrigue . Furthermore, Legal experts such as Michael Schmitt have advocated that psychological operations are lawful even directed towards civilian population until and unless they cause human harm or suffering. Psychological warfare serves as the bridge between different dimensions such as politics, sociology and psychology, often mentioned as combat of mind games. It is a non-kinetic tool that has been used as a strategic hand in armed conflicts, aiming to manipulate perceptions, weaken morale, and control enemy behavior. In contemporary world, one have no choice but to use propaganda warfare as a weapon. Countries such as the US have specifically recognized the propaganda directed towards “Civilian or Neutral Audiences” as a “permissible means of war”. However, when such tactics cross principled and legal boundaries, they become instruments of coercion and violence. In their view, the legal experts have identified three basic elements in Psychological warfare, namely (1) the target audiences, (2) the messages, and (3) the means of delivery, Schleifer ranks these three elements in order of importance.

Psychological warfare in historical context

“All warfare is based on deception”. “Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.” The concept of psychological warfare finds its roots in the teachings of Sun Tzu, the prominent Chinese strategist and military general. During the Korean War, Psychological warfare was strongly supported by Frank Pace, the then U.S. Secretary of the Army, who commended his forces to "bury the enemy with paper." By November 1950, approximately 120 million leaflets and these paper bullets had been printed and distributed across the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, loudspeakers and radio broadcasts were employed to achieve three primary military objectives; undermining the efficiency and resistance of North Korean and Chinese Communist forces, informing North Korean civilians about the war and warning them of approaching bombings, and subsequently, boosting the morale of South Korean troops. Throughout the time of Vietnam War the United States Army launched numerous PSYOP programs and distributed as many as 50 billion leaflets in an area the size of California during the course of the war. During the war the US military played eerie, ghostly sounds and voices (believed to be spirits of dead soldiers) in the jungle at night to exploit the Vietnamese belief in ancestral spirits. This was meant to frighten Viet Cong fighters into surrendering or retreating. In retaliation, The North Vietnamese capitalized on developing anti-war protests in the U.S, using media to emphasize American war crimes and civilian casualties to turn worldwide and national wide opinion against the war. In the prominence of Para Military case(Nicaragua v. US), the Nicaragua submitted evidence before the Court, including two publications that it claimed were prepared by the CIA and supplied to the Contras(non-state actor) in 1983. One of these publications, written in Spanish and titled "Operaciones Sicológicas en Guerra de Guerrillas" (Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare), was authored under the pseudonym "Tayacán” (psychological warfare manual). This implicated concerns with the wrongful use of psychological warfare, as the court noted legal concerns regarding the CIA Manual that;

• a. The Court noted that by the time the CIA became aware of the manual’s legal implications, the Contras were already utilizing it to commit crimes.
• b. Contrary to the CIA’s claim that the manual was intended to encourage moderate behavior among non-state actors, its content promoting propaganda tactics against the public and even the killing of civilians was in direct violation of the fundamental principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

The court found the manual to encourage the violation of IHL deriving from the notion of common article 1 which in hindsight requires all the parties to armed conflict to ensure the obligation and respect of IHL by its armed forces or any other non-state forces acting on the state’s behalf or is under effective control of that state. While a normally proclaimed objective of information or psychological operations is causing defection or rebellion within the armed forces of an adversary, The International Court of Justice in this case has highlighted the darker side of psychological warfare, where propaganda and psychological tactics are used not only to influence but to justify unlawful actions. In this regard The UN special Rapporteur has noted an alarming feature of today effect of psychological operations in an armed conflict is said to effect the large population of civilians rather than military personnel.

Digital context of Psychological warfare

As digital works and way are far more prevalent and effective in today’s warfare these types of technologies are used by belligerents to pursue their military goals. Given the far reaching influence of social media and the role of AI particularly in the context of “deep fakes” this can also be seen as a form of cyber warfare and is frequently used to incite violence and chaos among the general public. While these risk of violence and chaos by these tactics have always existed since the time of primitive Military Generals such as Sun Tzu, Alexander the Great and Genghis khan, these contemporary technological means guarantee the unprecedented speed and scale of such operations. With recent times, even non-state actors have discovered the utility of psychological warfare through cyber means, a luxury to weaker its stronger adversary state or a state backed adversary.

The perspective of the experts determine that the only counter to the psychological warfare is using the same means itself as no international organization or court of justice can shield them from this form of conduct. Psychological operations are too fluid and vague to be precisely defined or legally adjudicated. However, criminal liability can be occurred upon any legal or natural personality under International Criminal Law, for instance using AI, digital intelligence or machine intelligence to create deep fakes and fabricated videos to either induce or incite the commission of crime, assist or facilitate in the commission of a crime, pursues an unlawful action with a furtherance of common purpose or tries to install fear in the heart of civilian population exceeding certain level of fear and intimidation will be held criminally liable. Additionally, entities may attempt to avoid liability by claiming to be independent contractors with no direct involvement in the offense. However, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) still applies to all entities, including governmental authorities, private individuals, and state actors, imposing specific legal obligations on them. While the psychological or political propaganda may be called out as the lawful ruses of war, though the effects of their conduct shall be useful to determining whether they trigger the principles of Law of Armed Conflict. Conclusively, these operations are still kept within the perimeter of IHL’s Principles and they must uphold respect of individuals and civilians whether physically, morally, intellectually or psychologically. However if they exceed the boundaries/principles of the IHL, directing military operations against the civilian population and causing human suffering or harm, this may constitute an illegal ruse, in hindsight violating the IHL and its principles.

References

• ICTY Prosecutor vs Dusko Tadic, Para 124 and 127, 1997;
• Common article 35 of Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 1, ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons Para 95;
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